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Abstract—1 In this paper, secure transmission of information
over an ergodic fading channel is studied in the presence of
statistical quality of service (QoS) constraints.We employ effective
capacity to measure the secure throughput of the system, i.e.,
effective secure throughput. We assume that the channel side infor-
mation (CSI) of the main channel is available at the transmitter
side. Under different assumptions on the availability of the CSI
of the eavesdropper channel, we investigate the optimal power
control policies that maximize the effective secure throughput. In
particular, when the CSI of the eavesdropper channel is available
at the transmitter, it is noted that opportunistic transmission is
no longer optimal and the transmitter should not wait to send
the data at a high rate until the main channel is much better
than the eavesdropper channel. Moreover, it is shown that the
benefits of the CSI of the eavesdropper channel diminish as QoS
constraints become more stringent.
I. INTRODUCTION
Security is an important issue in wireless systems due to
the broadcast nature of wireless transmissions. In a pioneering
work, Wyner in [1] addressed the security problem from an
information-theoretic point of view and considered a wire-
tap channel model. He proved that secure transmission of
confidential messages to a destination in the presence of a
degraded wire-tapper can be achieved, and he established
the secrecy capacity which is defined as the highest rate of
reliable communication from the transmitter to the legitimate
receiver while keeping the wire-tapper completely ignorant of
the transmitted messages. Recently, there has been numerous
studies addressing information theoretic security. For instance,
the impact of fading has been investigated in [2], where it has
been shown that a non-zero secrecy capacity can be achieved
even when the eavesdropper channel is better than the main
channel on average. The secrecy capacity region of the fading
broadcast channel with confidential messages and associated
optimal power control policies have been identified in [3],
where it is shown that the transmitter allocates more power
as the strength of the main channel increases with respect to
that of the eavesdropper channel.
In addition to security issues, providing acceptable perfor-
mance and quality is vital to many applications. For instance,
voice over IP (VoIP) and interactive-video (e.g,. videocon-
ferencing) systems are required to satisfy certain buffer or
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delay constraints. In this paper, we consider statistical QoS
constraints in the form of limitations on the buffer length, and
incorporate the concept of effective capacity [4], which can be
seen as the maximum constant arrival rate that a given time-
varying service process can support while satisfying statistical
QoS guarantees. The analysis and application of effective
capacity in various settings have attracted much interest re-
cently (see e.g., [5]–[7] and references therein). We define the
effective secure throughput as the maximum constant arrival
rate that can be supported while keeping the eavesdropper
ignorant of these messages in the presence of QoS constraints.
We assume that the CSI of the main channel is available at
the transmitter side. Then, we derive the optimal power control
policies that maximize the effective secure throughput under
different assumptions on the availability of the CSI of the
eavesdropper channel. Through this analysis, we find that due
to the introduction of QoS constraints, the transmitter cannot
reserve its power for times at which the main channel is much
stronger than the eavesdropper channel. Also, we note that
the CSI of the eavesdropper provides little help when QoS
constraints become more stringent.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
briefly describes the system model and the necessary prelimi-
naries on statistical QoS constraints and effective capacity. In
Section III, we present our results for both full and only main
CSI scenarios. Finally, Section IV concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PRELIMINARIES
A. System Model
The system model is shown in Fig. 1. It is assumed that the
transmitter generates data sequences which are divided into
frames of duration T . These data frames are initially stored
in the buffer before they are transmitted over the wireless
channel. The channel input-output relationships are given by
Y1[i] = h1[i]X [i] + Z1[i] (1)
Y2[i] = h2[i]X [i] + Z2[i] (2)
where i is the frame index, X [i] is the channel input in the
ith frame, and Y1[i] and Y2[i] represent the channel outputs
at the receivers 1 and 2 in frame i, respectively. We assume
that {hj [i], j = 1, 2}’s are jointly stationary and ergodic
discrete-time processes, and we denote the magnitude-square
Fig. 1. The general system model.
of the fading coefficients by zj [i] = |hj [i]|2. Considering that
receiver 1 is the main user and receiver 2 is the eavesdropper,
we in the rest of the paper express z1 and z2 as zM and
zE , respectively, for more clarity. The channel input is subject
to an average power constraint E{|X [i]|2} ≤ P¯ , and we
assume that the bandwidth available for the system is B.
Above, the noise component Zj[i] is a zero-mean, circularly
symmetric, complex Gaussian random variable with variance
E{|Zj [i]|
2} = Nj for j = 1, 2. The additive Gaussian noise
samples {Zj[i]} are assumed to form an independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) sequence.
We denote the average transmitted signal to noise ratio with
respect to receiver 1 as SNR = P¯
N1B
. We also denote P [i]
as the instantaneous transmit power in the ith frame. Now,
the instantaneous transmitted SNR level for receiver 1 can be
expressed as µ1[i] = P [i]
N1B
. Then, the average power constraint
is equivalent to the average SNR constraint E{µ1[i]} ≤ SNR
for receiver 1. If we denote the ratio between the noise power
of the two channels as γ = N1
N2
, the instantaneous transmitted
SNR level for receiver 2 becomes µ2[i] = γµ1[i].
B. Statistical QoS Constraints and Effective Secure Through-
put
In [4], Wu and Negi defined the effective capacity as the
maximum constant arrival rate2 that a given service process
can support in order to guarantee a statistical QoS requirement
specified by the QoS exponent θ. If we define Q as the
stationary queue length, then θ is the decay rate of the tail
of the distribution of the queue length Q:
lim
q→∞
logP (Q ≥ q)
q
= −θ. (3)
Therefore, for large qmax, we have the following approxima-
tion for the buffer violation probability: P (Q ≥ qmax) ≈
2For time-varying arrival rates, effective capacity specifies the effective
bandwidth of the arrival process that can be supported by the channel.
e−θqmax . Hence, while larger θ corresponds to more strict
QoS constraints, smaller θ implies looser QoS guarantees.
Similarly, if D denotes the steady-state delay experienced in
the buffer, then P (D ≥ dmax) ≈ e−θδdmax for large dmax,
where δ is determined by the arrival and service processes
[6].
The effective capacity is given by
C(θ) = −
Λ(−θ)
θ
= − lim
t→∞
1
θt
loge E{e
−θS[t]} bits/s, (4)
where the expectation is with respect to S[t] =
∑t
i=1 s[i],
which is the time-accumulated service process. {s[i], i =
1, 2, . . .} denotes the discrete-time stationary and ergodic
stochastic service process. We define the effective capacity
obtained when the service rate is confined by the secrecy
capacity as the effective secure throughput.
In this paper, in order to simplify the analysis while consid-
ering general fading distributions, we assume that the fading
coefficients stay constant over the frame duration T and vary
independently for each frame and each user. In this scenario,
s[i] = TR[i], where R[i] is the instantaneous service rate for
confidential messages in the ith frame duration [iT, (i+1)T ].
Then, (4) can be written as
C(θ) = −
1
θT
loge Ez{e
−θTR[i]} bits/s, (5)
where R[i] in general depends on the fading magnitudes z =
(zM , zE). (5) is obtained using the fact that instantaneous rates
{R[i]} vary independently over different frames. The effective
secure throughput normalized by bandwidth B is
C(θ) =
C(θ)
B
bits/s/Hz. (6)
III. SECRECY CAPACITY WITH QOS CONSTRAINTS
Gopala et al. in [2] investigated the secrecy capacity in
ergodic fading channels without delay constraints. They con-
sidered two cases: full CSI at the transmitter and only main
CSI at the transmitter. In this section, we also consider these
two cases but in the presence of statistical QoS constraints.
A. Full CSI at the Transmitter
In this part, we assume that the perfect CSI of the main
channel and the eavesdropper channel is available at the
transmitter. The transmitter is able to adapt the transmitted
power according to the instantaneous values of zM and zE
only when zM > γzE . The secrecy capacity is then given by
Rs =


log2(1 + µ(zM , zE)zM )
− log2(1 + γµ(zM , zE)zE), zM > γzE
0, else.
(7)
where µ(zM , zE) is the optimal power allocated when zM and
zE are known at the transmitter.
In the presence of QoS constraints, the optimal power
allocation policy in general depends on the QoS exponent θ3.
3Due to this dependence, we henceforth use µ(θ, zM , zE) to denote the
power allocation policy under QoS constraints.
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Hence, the secure throughput can be expressed as
CE(θ) = max
µ(θ,zM ,zE)
E{µ(θ,zM ,zE)}≤SNR
−
1
θTB
loge
(∫ ∞
0
∫ zE
0
pzM (zM )pzE (zE)dzMdzE
+
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
zE
(
1 + µ(θ, zM , zE)zM
1 + γµ(θ, zM , zE)zE
)−β
pzM (zM )pzE (zE)dzMdzE
)
.
(8)
Note that the first term in the log function is a constant, and
log is a monotonically increasing function. The maximization
problem in (8) is equivalent to the following minimization
problem
min
µ(θ,zM ,zE)
E{µ(θ,zM ,zE)}≤SNR
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
zE
(
1 + µ(θ, zM , zE)zM
1 + γµ(θ, zM , zE)zE
)−β
× pzM (zM )pzE (zE)dzMdzE. (9)
It is easy to check that when zM > γzE
f(µ) =
(
1 + µzM
1 + γµzE
)−β
(10)
is a convex function in µ. According to [9], non-negative
integral preserves convexity, hence the objective function is
convex in µ. Then, we can form the following Lagrangian
function, denoted as J :
J =
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
zE
(
1 + µ(θ, zM , zE)zM
1 + γµ(θ, zM , zE)zE
)−β
pzM (zM )pzE (zE)dzMdzE
+ λ
(∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
zE
µ(θ, zM , zE)pzM (zM )pzE (zE)dzMdzE − SNR
)
(11)
Taking the derivative of the Lagrangian function over
µ(θ, zM , zE), we get the following optimality condition:
∂J
∂µ(θ, zM , zE)
= λ− β
(
1 + µ(θ, zM , zE)zM
1 + γµ(θ, zM , zE)zE
)−β
×
zM − γzE
(1 + µ(θ, zM , zE)zM )(1 + γµ(θ, zM , zE)zE)
= 0
(12)
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier whose value is chosen to
satisfy the average power constraint with equality. For any
channel state pairs (zM , zE), µ(θ, zM , zE) can be obtained
from the above condition. Whenever the value of µ(θ, zM , zE)
is negative, it follows from the convexity of the objective
function with respect to µ(θ, zM , zE) that the optimal value
of µ(θ, zM , zE) is 0.
There is no closed-form solution to (12). However, since
the left-hand side of (12) is a monotonically increasing con-
cave function, numerical techniques such as bisection search
method can be efficiently adopted to derive the solution.
The secure throughput can be determined by substituting
the optimal power control policy for µ(θ, zM , zE) in (8).
Exploiting the optimality condition in (12), we can notice that
when µ(θ, zM , zE) = 0, we have zM −γzE = λβ . Meanwhile,(
1 + µ(θ, zM , zE)zM
1 + γµ(θ, zM , zE)zE
)−β
×
1
(1 + µ(θ, zM , zE)zM )(1 + γµ(θ, zM , zE)zE)
< 1. (13)
Thus, we must have zM − γzE > λβ for µ(θ, zM , zE) > 0,
i.e., µ(θ, zM , zE) = 0 if zM −γzE ≤ λβ . Hence, we can write
the secure throughput as
CE(θ) = −
1
θTB
loge
(∫ ∞
0
∫ γzE+λβ
0
pzM (zM )pzE (zE)dzMdzE
+
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
γzE+
λ
β
(
1 + µ(θ, zM , zE)zM
1 + γµ(θ, zM , zE)zE
)−β
× pzM (zM )pzE (zE)dzMdzE
)
(14)
where µ(θ, zM , zE) is the derived optimal power control
policy.
B. Only Main Channel CSI at the Transmitter
In this section, we assume that the transmitter has only the
CSI of the main channel (the channel between the transmitter
and the legitimate receiver). Under this assumption, it is shown
in [2] that the secrecy rate for a specific channel state pair
becomes
Rs = [log2(1 + µ(zM )zM )− log2(1 + γµ(zM )zE)]
+ (15)
where µ(zM ) is the optimal power allocated when only zM is
known at the transmitter.
In this case, the secure throughput can be expressed as
CE(θ) = max
µ(θ,zM )
E{µ(θ,zM )}≤SNR
−
1
θTB
loge
(∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
zM
pzM (zM )pzE (zE)dzEdzM
+
∫ ∞
0
∫ zM
0
(
1 + µ(θ, zM )zM
1 + γµ(θ, zM )zE
)−β
pzM (zM )pzE (zE)dzEdzM
)
.
(16)
Similar to the discussion in Section III-A, we get the following
equivalent minimization problem:
min
µ(θ,zM)
E{µ(θ,zM)}≤SNR
∫ ∞
0
∫ zM
0
(
1 + µ(θ, zM )zM
1 + γµ(θ, zM )zE
)−β
× pzM (zM )pzE (zE)dzMdzE .
(17)
The objective function in this case is convex, and with a similar
Lagrangian optimization method, we can get the following
3
10−5 10−4 10−3 10−2 10−1 100
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
θ
Se
cu
re
 th
ro
ug
hp
ut
 (b
ps
/H
z)
SNR=0 dB
Full CSI
Main CSI
Fig. 2. The effective secure throughput with θ in Rayleigh channel with
E{zE} = E{zM} = 1. γ = 1.
optimality condition:
∂J
∂µ(θ, zM )
= −β
∫ zM
0
(
1 + µ(θ, zM )zM
1 + γµ(θ, zM )zE
)−β−1
×
zM − γzE
(1 + γµ(θ, zM )zE)2
pzE (zE)dzE + λ = 0
(18)
where λ is a constant chosen to satisfy the average power
constraint with equality. If the obtained power level µ(θ, zM )
is negative, then the optimal value of µ(θ, zM ) becomes 0
according to the convexity of the objective function in (17).
Now that non-negative integral does not change the concavity,
the LHS of (18) is still a monotonic increasing concave
function of µ(θ, zM ).
The secure throughput can be determined by substituting the
optimal power control policy for µ(θ, zM ) in (16). Exploiting
the optimality condition in (18), we can notice that when
µ(θ, zM , zE) = 0, we have
−β
∫ zM
0
(zM − γzE)pzE(zE)dzE + λ = 0 (19)
⇒
∫ zM
0
P (zE ≤ t)dt =
λ
β
(20)
Denote the solution to the above equation as α. Considering
that(
1 + µ(θ, zM , zE)zM
1 + γµ(θ, zM , zE)zE
)−β−1
1
(1 + γµ(θ, zM , zE)zE)2
< 1,
(21)
we must have zM > α for µ(θ, zM ) > 0, i.e., µ(θ, zM ) = 0
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Fig. 3. The effective secure throughput with SNR in Rayleigh channel with
E{zE} = E{zM} = 1. γ = 1.
if zM ≤ α. Hence, we can write the secure throughput as
CE(θ) = −
1
θTB
loge
(∫ α
0
∫ ∞
0
pzM (zM )pzE (zE)dzEdzM
+
∫ ∞
α
∫ ∞
zM
pzM (zM )pzE (zE)dzEdzM
+
∫ ∞
α
∫ zM
0
(
1 + µ(θ, zM )zM
1 + γµ(θ, zM )zE
)−β
(22)
× pzM (zM )pzE (zE)dzEdzM
)
(23)
where µ(θ, zM ) is the derived optimal power control policy.
C. Numerical Results
In Fig. 2, we plot the effective secure throughput as a
function of the QoS exponent θ in Rayleigh fading channel
with γ = 1 for the full and main CSI scenarios. It can be
seen from the figure that as the QoS constraints become more
stringent and hence as the value of θ increases, little help
is provided by the CSI of the eavesdropper channel. In Fig.
3, we plot the effective secure throughput as SNR varies for
θ = {0, 0.001, 0.01, 0.1}. Not surprisingly, we observe that
the availability of the CSI of the eavesdropper channel at the
transmitter does not provide much gains in terms of increasing
the effective secure throughput in the large SNR regime. Also,
as QoS constraints becomes more strict, we similarly note that
having the CSI of the eavesdropper channel does not increase
the rate of secure transmission much even at medium SNR
levels.
To have an idea of the power allocation policy, we plot the
power distribution as a function of (zE , zM ) for full CSI case
when θ = 0.01 and θ = 0 in Fig. 4. In the figure, we see that
for both values of θ, no power is allocated for transmission
when zM < zE which is expected under the assumption
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Fig. 4. The power allocation for full CSI scenario with SNR = 0 dB in
Rayleigh channel with E{zE} = E{zM} = 1. γ = 1.
of equal noise powers, i.e., N1 = N2. We note that when
θ = 0 and hence there are no buffer constraints, opportunistic
transmission policy is employed. More power is allocated for
cases in which the difference zM − zE is large. Therefore,
the transmitter favors the times at which the main channel is
much better than the eavesdropper channel. At these times,
the transmitter sends the information at a high rate with large
power. When zM−zE is small, transmission occurs at a small
rate with small power. However, this strategy is clearly not
optimal in the presence of buffer constraints because waiting
to transmit at high rate until the main channel becomes much
stronger than the eavesdropper channel can lead to buildup in
the buffer and incur large delays. Hence, we do not observe
this opportunistic transmission strategy when θ = 0.01. In
this case, we note that a more uniform power allocation is
preferred. In order not to violate the limitations on the buffer
length, transmission at a moderate power level is performed
even when zM − zE is small.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have anayzed the secrecy capacity in the
presence of statistical QoS constraints. We have considered the
effective secure throughput as a measure of the performance.
With different assumptions on the availability of the full
and main CSI at the transmitter, we have investigated the
associated optimal power allocation policies that maximize
the effective secure throughput. In particular, we have noted
that the transmitter allocates power more uniformly instead
of concentrating its power for the cases in which the main
channel is much stronger than the eavesdropper channel. By
numerically comparing the obtained effective secure through-
put, we have shown that as QoS constraints become more
stringent, the benefit of having the CSI of the eavesdropper
channel at the transmitter diminishes.
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